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I. Introduction 
This article provides an annual survey of the law summarizing 
developments in  oil and gas for the State of Montana.  Oil and gas in the 
State of Montana make up a relatively small portion of the state’s profile; 
Montana currently ranks fourteenth in crude oil production and twentieth in 
natural gas production in the United States.
1
  
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
A. State Legislative Developments 
The Montana State Legislature only convenes in odd years.  The State 
ended its 2019 Session on April 25, 2019.  As such, there was no regular 
legislative session in 2020 and no special sessions.  Therefore, there were 
no significant legislative developments for 2020.  
B. State Regulatory Developments  
 1. ARM 36.22.1242 
Amendments have been made to ARM 36.22.1242 regarding Reports by 
Producers – Tax Report – Tax Rate effective January 1, 2020.  Specifically, 
ARM 36.22.1242(2) has been amended to reflect that the privilege and 
license tax on every barrel of crude petroleum and each 10,000 cubic feet of 
natural gas produced, saved, and marketed, or stored within the state or 
exported therefrom shall be 83.33 percent (previously, 100 percent) of the 
rate authorized in Mont. Code Ann. § 82-11-131, (3/10 of 1%) of the 
market value thereof.  This rule effectively applies to all crude petroleum 
and natural gas produced on and after January 1, 2020. 
  
                                                                                                             
 1. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Montana State Profile and Energy 
Estimates, https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=MT ( last visited August 21, 2020).  
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III. Judicial Developments 
A. Montana Supreme Court 
1. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following question to 
the Montana Supreme Court: “Whether, under Montana law, dinosaur 
fossils constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose of a mineral reservation?”
2
  The 
Montana Supreme Court answered, stating, “We conclude that, under 
Montana law, dinosaur fossils do not constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose 
of a mineral reservation.”
3
 
The certified question arose due to a dispute between owners of the 
surface estate (the “Murrays”) and the majority owners of the underlying 
mineral estate (the “Seversons”).
4
  By a 2005 deed, the Murrays acquired 
the Seversons’ interest in the surface estate, and the Seversons reserved a 
combined two-thirds of the mineral estate.
5
  Following execution of the 
deed, the Murrays discovered a “spike cluster” of fossils on the property.
6
  
A subsequent investigation revealed the fossils were extremely rare and 
valuable.
7
 
Procedurally, this case began in 2013 when the Seversons asserted an 
ownership interest in the fossils based upon their mineral title.
8
  In 
response, the Murrays filed suit in Montana state court seeking a judgment 
declaring that the Seversons did not own an interest in the fossils.
9
  The 
Seversons removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana and counterclaimed, seeking a judgment that fossils are 
“minerals” and part of their mineral estate.
10
  The district court granted 
summary judgment to the Murrays, and upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed.
11
  After a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit certified the 
question above and the Montana Supreme Court accepted.
12
 
                                                                                                             
 2. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying 
questions to 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80.  
 3. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80, 93.  
 4. Murray, 464 P.3d at 81-82. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 82. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 83. 
 12. Id. 
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Rejecting the Seversons’ argument that the fossils qualified as minerals 
under past Montana jurisprudence and a Texas two-part test, the Montana 
Supreme Court narrowed in on three factors.
13
  First, it acknowledged that 
rarity and value may be a factor in determining mineral status, but the 
inquiry is not determinative.
14
  Similarly, whether a substance is 
“scientifically” a mineral is not determinative unless the parties intended to 
use a scientific definition for minerals.
15
  Last, the court added to its 
consideration “the relation of the material in question to the surface of the 
land, and the method and effect of the material’s removal.”
16
  In sum, the 
court stated that the “best method for determining whether a substance fits 
within the ordinary and natural meaning of ‘mineral’ is to use contextual 
clues.”
17
  
Applying that method, the court first examined the language of 
“minerals” used in the subject deed.
18
  It highlighted that the subject deed 
referred to “oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and other minerals,” and to the right of 
“mining, drilling, exploring, operating, and developing said lands.”
19
  
Secondly, the court noted that Montana statutes use the word “mineral” in 
several contexts, but never mention or contemplate fossils.
20
  Thus, “in the 
context of a general mineral reservation deed, where the parties have not 
manifested a different intention in the transacting document, the language 
identifying ‘mineral’ would not ordinarily and naturally include fossils.”
21
   
Next, the court considered “whether the mineral content of the material 
in question renders it ‘rare and valuable.’”
22
  The court concluded that 
“because the rarity and value of dinosaur fossils is not a circumstance of 
their mineral composition and consequent usefulness for refinement and 
economic exploitation, they are not considered to fall within the ordinary 
and natural meaning of ‘minerals’ as that term is used in a general mineral 
deed.”
23
  The last factor the court considered is “relation to the surface of 
the land, and the method and effect of its removal.”
24
  Analogizing dinosaur 
                                                                                                             
 13. See Id. at 84. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 84-85. 
 20. Id. at 87-89. 
 21. Id. at 90. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 92. 
 24. Id.   
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fossils to limestone, the court found that dinosaur fossils “bear a 
relationship so close to the surface as to be reasonably considered as part of 
the surface, rather than the mineral, estate.”
25
 
In sum, the court declined to “stretch the term ‘mineral’ so far outside its 
ordinary meaning as to include dinosaur fossils” and concluded “that, under 
Montana law, dinosaur fossils do not constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose 
of a mineral reservation.”
26
 
B. Federal Court Cases  
1. Northern Plains Resource Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit) 
The United States District Court for the District of Montana issued an 
initial ruling in this case on April 15, 2020
27
 and subsequently modified it 
on May 11, 2020
28
.  Defendant-intervenor State of Montana appealed the 
decision to the Ninth Circuit, which remains pending.  By its modified 
ruling, the district court enjoined any dredge or fill activities for new 
pipeline construction projects under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the 
“Corps”) Nationwide Permit 12 (“NWP 12”) until the Corps engages in the 
consultation process required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”) and other environmental statutes and regulations.
29
 
The Corps has authority to regulate discharges into the navigable 
waterways of the United States pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act.
30
  Pursuant to such authority, the Corps first issued NWP 12 in 1977 to 
regulate discharges resultingfrom activities associated with utility lines and 
related facilities.
31
  Utility lines include oil and gas pipelines and related 
activities such as construction, maintenance, and removal of pipelines like 
the Keystone XL Pipeline.
32
  NWP 12 allows discharges of dredged or fill 
material into U.S. waters.
33
 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 93. 
 27. Northern Plains  Res.Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. CV-19-44-GF-
BMM, 2020 WL 1875455, at *1 (D. Mont. April 15, 2020), amended by 2020 WL 3638125 
(D. Mont.). 
 28. Northern Plains  Res.Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. CV-19-44-GF-
BMM, 2020 WL 3638125, at *14 (D. Mont. May 11, 2020).  
 29. Northern Plains  Res.Council, 2020 WL 3638125 at *14. 
 30. Northern Plains  Res.Council, 2020 WL 1875455 at *1. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Id. 
 33. Id. 
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Plaintiffs, a collective of environmental organizations, sought review of 
the Corps’ decision to renew NWP 12.  The Corps asserted that in reissuing 
NWP 12, it had considered the environmental impact as required by the 
ESA and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) because 
General Condition 18 of NWP 12 prohibits activities likely to jeopardize 
endangered species or adversely modify critical habitats and activities 
under NWP 12 would have minimal impacts.
34
  Therefore, the Corps 
argued, it did not need to consult the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and/or 
the National Marine Fisheries Services prior to reissuing NWP 12.
35
 
Plaintiffs argued that the Corps’ failure to undertake such consultation 
violated the ESA and that the Corps should have initiated programmatic 
consultation during reissuance of NWP 12.
36
  Noting the low ESA threshold 
for consultation, the district court found that the Corps should have initiated 
a consultation under the ESA prior to reissuing NWP 12.
37
  The court 
further stated that the Corps may not circumvent Section 7 of the ESA by 
allowing project-level reviews or relying on General Condition 18 of NWP 
12.
38
 
Ultimately, the district court enjoined the Corps from authorizing “any 
dredge or fill activities under NWP 12 pending completion of the 
consultation process and compliance with all environmental statutes and 
regulations” and then modified the initial order to apply only to new 
pipeline construction projects and not non-pipeline and/or routine 
maintenance, inspection, and repair activities on existing NWP 12 
projects.
39
 
2. Montana Wildlife Federation v. Bernhardt 
The United States District Court for the District of Montana voided acres 
of federal leases due to actions by the Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) in a sage-grouse habitat area.
40
  In 2015, the BLM amended 
provisions in 98 land-management plans in an effort to protect sage-
grouse.
41
  Specifically, the plans required that “[p]riority will be given to 
                                                                                                             
 34. Id, at *2-3. 
 35. Id. at *3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at *5. 
 38. Id. at *6. 
 39. Northern Plains  Res.Council, 2020 WL 3638125 at *14. 
 40. Montana Wildlife  Fed’n v. Bernhardt, No. CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 WL 
2615631, at *1 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020). 
 41. Montana Wildlife  Fed’n, 2020 WL 2615631 at *1. 
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leasing and development…outside of [sage-grouse habitat].”
42
  Here, the 
central question to be answered was what it meant to give something 
priority.
43
  
Plaintiffs brought suit seeking a review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”), alleging that BLM violated the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) when it executed certain lease 
sales in December 2017 and March 2018 (Montana) and in June 2018 
(Wyoming).
44
  The tracts subject to the leases were entirely or significantly 
within “General” or “Priority” sage-grouse habitat.
45
  
Lease sales conducted by BLM are subject to the FLPMA, which 
requires compliance “by developing, maintaining and revising Resource 
Management Plans (‘RMPs’)” that “establish ‘[l]and areas for limited, 
restricted or exclusive use’ and determine ‘[a]llowable resource uses…and 
related levels of production or use to be maintained.”
46
  The applicable 
RMPs “directed BLM field offices to prioritize leasing outside” of the 
general and priority sage-grouse habitat areas.
47
  Instruction Memorandum 
2016-143 (“2016 IM”) provided additional guidance to the implementation 
of the RMPs.
48
  Specifically, it required prioritization at both the leasing 
and development stages, setting forth “six broad sections that each contain 
different actions”  to accomplish the conservation goals.
49
  Subsequently, 
BLM issued “Instruction Memorandum 2018-026 (“2018 IM”), which 
replaced the 2016 IM and stated “[i]n effect, the BLM does not need to 
lease and develop outside of [sage-grouse] habitat management areas before 
considering any leasing and development within” them and “should 
implement the new prioritization policy” where “the BLM has a backlog of 
Expressions of Interest for leasing.”
50
 
As a threshold matter, the court first decided whether or not the 2018 IM 
was a “final agency action” such that it could be challenged and concluded 
that it was.
51
  Second, the court found that the 2018 IM violated the 
FLPMA because it contracted the 2015 amended land-management plans in 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *4-5. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at *2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at *3. 
 49. Id. at *3-4. 
 50. Id. at *4. 
 51. Id. at *5-7. 
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two ways: (1) “limiting the prioritization requirement only to situations 
when BLM faces a backlog of EOIs,” and (2) it “misconstrues the 2015 
Plans and renders the prioritization requirement into a mere procedural 
hurdle.”
52
  Moreover, the court found the BLM violated the APA for lack of 
a “satisfactory explanation” as to why it reinterpreted prioritization to apply 
only when there was a backlog.
53
  Finally, the court determined the lease 
sales violated the FLPMA because they “explicitly, or in effect, follow the 
same rationale as the 2018 IM.”
54
 
Accordingly, the lease sales were voided with the court adding “BLM’s 
errors undercut the very reason that the 2015 Plans created a priority 
requirement in the first place and prevent BLM from fulfilling that 
requirement’s goals and the errors here occurred at the beginning of 
the…lease sales process, infecting everything that followed.”
55
 
 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at *8. 
 53. Id. at *9. 
 54. Id. at *10. 
 55. Id. 
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